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Notes
Estate Planning for the Close Corporation
Planning for an estate which contains the controlling interest
in a close corporation often presents a difficult problem. Since
a sale of the corporation, or the testator's interest in it, may not
realize the full value of the business, and since a liquidation of
the assets sacrifices the going concern value of the operation,1
the usual objective is to devise a plan for the continuation of
the business after the testator's death. A further complicating
factor is the common desire of the testator that the control and
remainder interest in the business be given to one heir while the
return on the controlling interest be used to provide suitable
support for another.
With these goals in mind, the most obvious dispositive plan
is to create a trust funded by the controlling interest, naming
one heir trustee and the other beneficiary. However, the utility
of such a plan-often termed an estate corporation-has been
frustrated by the application of traditional fiduciary obligations
to the trustee, particularly the duty of undivided loyalty with
no further inquiry.2 This Note will explore the problems in-
herent in an estate corporation, examine alternative plans for
the disposition of a business interest, and suggest a trust instru-
ment to avoid or mitigate these problems.
I. DUTIES OF A TRUSTEE-DIRECTOR
As used in this Note, an "estate corporation" is a close cor-
poration in which the controlling interest is held by executors or
testamentary trustees.3 When an estate contains a corporation,
1. See generally Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Sub-
stantial Interest in a Closely Held Business, 44 IowA L. REV. 83, 107-37(1958), for an analysis of the factors to be considered before sale of an
estate corporation.
2. See notes 12-16 infra and accompanying text.
3. The original definition of an estate corporation included the
"post mortem" corporation-a corporation organized by executors or
trustees pursuant to testamentary instructions to'carry on decedent's
business. Cahn, Estate Corporations, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 136 (1937). See
also Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Strangle-
hold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
506, 519 (1962); Pierson, Stock of a Closely Held Corporation as an
Original Trust Res or a Subsequent Investment, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 38(1958); Note, The Fiduciary Aspects of Estate Corporations, 57 MicH.
L. REv. 738 (1959); Note, The Trust Corporation: Dual Fiduciary Duties
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the executor or trustee may become an officer or director of the
corporation. The resulting dual role is necessitated by the nature
of a trust, the res of which is the controlling interest in a busi-
ness4 as distinguished from an investment trust, the res of which
is noncontrolling interests, such as stocks and bonds of public
companies. An investment trust presents relatively simple man-
agement decisions-buy, sell or retain. On the other hand, the
management of a controlling interest in a corporation entails
complex and recurring decisions inherent in the operation of a
business. The ease with which management decisions are made
in an investment trust leads to a correspondingly simple causal
connection between a particular decision by the trustee and an
alleged breach of trust, while the complexity of decisions in an
estate corporation renders this relationship unclear.5 Further, in
terms of the interests relevant to the decision making process,
the trustee of an investment trust should consider solely the
interest of the beneficiary.6 However, the trustee-director of an
estate corporation must consider the additional interests of the
corporation's future, the minority shareholders, the creditors,
and the employees.7 The courts, unfortunately, have been
and the Conflict of Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (1961).
Except for the act of incorporation, the problems of the two types
of estate corporations do not differ significantly. Compare Pyle v. Pyle,
137 App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y. Supp. 256 (1910) (post mortem), with In re
Hirsch's Estate, 116 App. Div. 367, 101 N.Y. Supp. 893 (1906). How-
ever, the act of incorporating a post mortem corporation may present
some problems. In re Halperin's Will, 201 Misc. 763, 106 N.Y.S.2d 96
(SuIr. Ct. 1951), held that the surviving spouse's right of election
against the will could not be destroyed by testamentary instructions
to incorporate.
4. See Cowdery, Planning Before Acceptance, 93 TRUSTS & EsTATES
105 (1954). See also Durand, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments:
Retention of Decedent's Business, 95 TRusTs & ESTATES 907, 911 (1956).
5. Illustrative of the judicial confusion created by the estate cor-
poration is the issue whether a beneficiary may seek his remedy in a
court of original jurisdiction or whether he is required to proceed in
the court to which the trustee must account. Most older cases held
that the latter court retained exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of admis-
sion to probate. See, e.g., In re Kahn's Estate, 43 Misc. 2d 208, 250
N.Y.S.2d 781 (Surr. Ct. 1964); In re Barrett's Estate, 168 Misc. 937, 6
N.Y.S.2d 689 (Surr. Ct. 1938). Consequently, the traditional trust
remedies of removal, surcharge, and accounting are available, and the
higher standard of loyalty imposed on a testamentary trustee is appli-
cable. Recently, however, it was held that a suit by the beneficiary in
surrogate court to require an estate corporation to pay a dividend had
been properly dismissed without prejudice to bring a derivative suit.
Cashman v. Petrie, 14 N.Y.2d 426, 201 N.E.2d 24 (1964).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRuSTS § 170 (1959).
7. See Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Super.
:Ct. Ch. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953); Latorraca v. Lator-
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slow" to recognize these fundamental differences,9 and in most
instances have rigidly applied the principles developed in the
context of the investment trust to the estate corporation. 10
The application of the trustee's duty of undivided loyalty
with no further inquiry to the trustee-director of an estate cor-
poration is the crucial problem. The classic statement of this
traditional duty was made by Judge Cardozo:
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
raca, 132 N.J. Eq. 40, 26 A.2d 522 (Ch. 1942), aff'd mem., 133 N.J. Eq.
298, 31 A.2d 819 (1943); In re Auditore's Estate, 223 App. Div. 654, 229
N.Y. Supp. 414, aff'd, 249 N.Y. 335, 164 N.E. 242 (1928); In re Schnur's
Estate, 39 Misc. 2d 880, 242 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Surr. Ct. 1963).
8. Pierson, Stock of a Closely Held Corporation as an Original
Trust Res or a Subsequent Investment, 11 OKLA. L. REv. 38, 40 (1958).
9. The analytic problem has been phrased in terms of a decision
whether to apply principles developed in the context of trust admin-
istration or corporate management to the hybrid estate corporation. See
Calm, supra note 3, at 136. The courts reason in terms of "piercing the
corporate veil." See In re Warner's Trust, 263 Minn. 449, 117 N.W.2d
224 (1962); In re Tuttle's Estate, 4 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 149 N.E.2d 715, 717
(1958); Matter of Auditore, 278 N.Y. 234, 15 N.E. 593 (1938); Note, The
Fiduciary Aspects of Estate Corporations, 57 MicH. L. REV. 738 (1959).
However, at least one court has refused to conceptualize the prob-
lem in this way. The court in In re Schnur's Estate, 39 Misc. 2d 880,
886, 242 N.Y.S.2d 126, 132 (Surr. Ct. 1963), declared: "It is not so
much a matter of disregarding the corporate form, but rather of giving
paramount consideration to the testamentary plan and scheme, and
effectuating it in the manner prescribed by the testator."
The modern trend appears to be away from a rigid application of
trust principles in favor of the application of corporate law. See, e.g.,
Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1952),
aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953); Cashman v. Petrie, 19 App. Div.
2d 520, 240 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 426, 201 N.E.2d 24 (1964);
In re Halperin's Will, 201 Misc. 763, 106 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Surr. Ct. 1951)
(dictum). See also Note, The Trust Corporation: Dual Fiduciary Duties
and the Conflict of Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 731 (1961).
A small number of well reasoned opinions reject the mechanical
application of either body of law, recognizing that the problems lie
somewhere between the two. See In re Schnur's Estate, 39 Misc. 2d
880, 242 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Surr. Ct. 1963); In re Nickelsburg's Estate, 34
Misc. 2d 82, 224 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
10. See In re Horowitz's Will, 297 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E.2d 598 (1948):
"An executor who, to carry out his trust, becomes a director of a cor-
poration in which the estate's moneys are invested, remains an executor
and is held to the full duty of an executor." Id. at 258, 78 N.E.2d at 601.
See also In re Koretzky's Estate, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951);
In re Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951); In re Adler's
Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Matter of
McLaughlin's Estate, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
But see Cashman v. Petrie, 19 App. Div. 2d 520, 240 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1963),
aff'd, 14 N.Y. 2d 426, 201 N.E.2d 24 (1964); In re Halperin's Will, 201
Misc. 763, 106 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Surr. Ct. 1951) (dictum); Note, The Trust
Corporation: Dual Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of Institutions, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 713, 731 (1961).
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sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of the courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular excep-
tions."
A trustee may not consider third party interest no matter how
intuitively relevant, and is forbidden from acting in his own
interest.12 Traditionally, once a conflict of interests is found,
no further inquiry is necessary to hold the trustee liable. 3 The
trustee can be removed from office,' 4 surcharged for losses to
the trust, 5 or forced to account for gains to others than the
beneficiary,' 6 good faith and fairness of action notwithstanding.
Within the context of a trust containing liquid stocks or
bonds, a strict application of the duty of undivided loyalty with
no further inquiry may effectively deter an unscrupulous trustee
from taking advantage of his position through clandestine ac-
tivities.1'7 However, as the trust res and its management deci-
11. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
See generally, RESTATEMTENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959); BOGERT,
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. 1960); 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170 (2d ed.
1956); Hoover, Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty, 5 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REv. 7 (1956).
12. Hoover, Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty, 5 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 7, 9 (1956). See also RESTATEMTENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §
170(1) (1957): "The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." It has
been pointed out that self-dealing is only one branch of the duty of
loyalty. Thus, if the conflict of interests involves a third party, the
standard of liability to be applied would differ from that when the
trustee's own interest was involved. See Scott, The Trustee's Duty of
Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REV. 521 (1936).
13. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51
N.E.2d 674 (1943); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545
(1928); Haggerty, Conflicting Interests of Estate Fiduciaries in New
York and the "No Further Inquiry" Rule, 18 FORDHAm L. REV. 1 (1949);
Hoover, supra note 12.
14. See Taylor v. Errion, 137 N.J. Eq. 221, 44 A.2d 356 (Ch. 1945),
aff'd mem., 140 N.J. Eq. 495, 55 A.2d 11 (1947); Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App.
Div. 568, 122 N.Y. Supp. 256 (1910); In re Hirsch's Estate, 116 App. Div.
367, 101 N.Y. Supp. 893 (1906); BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 861 (2d
ed. 1960).
15. See In re Horowitz's Will, 297 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E.2d 598 (1948);
BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 862 (2d ed. 1960); 14 Alum. L. REV. 308
(1930). Some courts have stated that a greater breach of duty is re-
quired to remove a trustee than to surcharge him. See In re Berri, 130
Misc. 527, 224 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1927); In re Hartt's Estate, 295
P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1956).
16. Cf. Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150 (1876) (dictum).
17. It is often stated that this deterrent effect is the major pur-
pose and justification for the no further inquiry rule. See, e.g., Matter
[Vol. 51:725
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sions become more complex, strict application of the duty be-
comes unrealistic. In restricting and inhibiting the trustee from
using the skill, experience, and "connections" for which he was
selected, a strict application of this rule to a complex trust ig-
nores modern economic realities."' Furthermore, the disinte-
grating erosion of which Cardozo spoke has in fact occurred,
thus eliminating a major justification for a rigid application of
the rule.19 Consequently, in an estate corporation the traditional
duty of undivided loyalty without further inquiry should be
modified. Since a trustee is under the duty to take charge of
the trust res, 20 he presumably will be required to become a di-
rector or officer of a close corporation of which the trust con-
tains a controlling interest.21 Yet this very act of becoming a
director-officer imposes duties on the trustee toward the cor-
poration, its shareholders and creditors, which place him in a
position of divided loyalty. Assuming that the trustee is se-
lected because of his skill in running the corporation, he should
not be forced to withdraw from his position as director,22 de-
priving the corporation of its best possible management; nor
should he be forced to resign as trustee,23 thereby relinquish-
ing control of the corporation. With either alternative the cor-
poration would suffer and, insofar as the trust is dependent
of Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 405-06, 52 N.E.2d 909, 922 (1943); Hoover, supra
note 12, at 11.
18. See Haggerty, Conflicting Interests of Estate Fiduciaries in
New York and the "No Further Inquiry" Rule, 18 FoRDBAm L. REV. 1,
24 (1949); Niles, The Divided-Loyalty Rule, 91 TRUSTS & ESTATES 734
(1952); Niles & Schwartz, Breach of Trust-Recent Developments, 20
N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1944).
19. See Hoover, supra note 12.
20. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 169 (1959).
21. Some courts would require the trustee to become a director of
the corporation. See Latorraca v. Latorraca, 132 N.J. Eq. 40, 26 A.2d
522 (Ch. 1942), af'd mem., 133 N.J. Eq. 298, 31 A.2d 819 (1943); In re
Teasdale's Estate, 261 Wis. 248, 52 N.W.2d 366 (1952); In re Peabody's
Estate, 218 Wis. 541, 260 N.W. 444 (1935); In re Hartt's Estate, 295 P.2d
985 (Wyo. 1956). But see In re Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d
888 (1951).
22. See In re Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 251, 97 N.E.2d 888, 894
(1951); Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App. Div. 568, 572, 122 N.Y. Supp. 256, 260
(1910).
23. It is arguable under existing law that a trustee of an estate
corporation who becomes a director will be individually liable for all
losses, and accountable for all gains to the corporation. See In re
Horowitz's Will, 297 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E.2d 598 (1948); In re Gibson's Es-
tate, 46 Misc. 2d 954, 261 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Surr. Ct. 1965) (proof of good
faith will not offer protection); In re Tannenbaum's Estate, 219 N.Y.S.
2d 149 (Surr. Ct. 1961), modified, 20 App. Div. 2d 808, 248 N.Y.S.2d 749
(1964), aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 829, 205 N.E.2d 866 (1965).
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upon the corporation, the trust beneficiaries would suffer.2 4
Few courts have faced squarely the issue of applying the
duty of undivided loyalty to the trustee-director of an estate
corporation. Moreover, the solutions evolved have not been
adequate. The majority of the cases have applied the duty rig-
idly, surcharging or removing the trustee for acting with conflict-
ing interests.25 A strong minority of cases refuse to impose lia-
bility, but on grounds which are analytically unsatisfactory.
One line of the minority assumes the ostrich-like position of
denying any conflict of interest. In Matter of Tannenbaum,2 6
the executrix held half the shares of a corporation in trust and
half in her individual capacity. She liquidated the corporation
and sold the assets to herself without payment for good will.
The legatees sought an accounting for the value of the good will.
The surrogate surcharged her for acting with conflicting inter-
ests. The appellate division reversed on this issue, two judges
dissenting, stating that there was no conflict of interests.27 Be-
cause the corporation would have been destroyed unless the
liquidation was effected, the correct result was reached. How-
ever, since the defendant had at least three interests affected by
the liquidation-executrix, director of the corporation, share-
24. As one commentator summarized the matter:
It is doubtful that the trustee-director will feel free to follow
his corporate conscience when faced with the possibility of sur-
charge-especially where this possibility hinges upon the clar-
ification of confusing and seemingly contradictory rules of law.
* . . These restraints cannot but injure the corporation com-
petitively .... [T]his can work to the advantage of no one
concerned.
Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 713, 723 (1962).
25. See In re Koretzky's Estate, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951);
Taylor v. Errion, 137 N.J. Eq. 221, 44 A.2d 356 (Ch. 1945), aff'd mem.,
140 N.J. Eq. 495, 55 A.2d 11 (1947); In re Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246,
97 N.E.2d 888 (1951); In re Horowitz's Will, 297 N.Y. 252, 79 N.E.2d 598
(1948); Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y. Supp. 256 (1910); In,
re Tannenbaum's Estate, 30 Misc. 2d 743, 219 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Surr. Ct.
1961), modified, 20 App. Div. 2d 808, 248 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1964), affd
mem., 15 N.Y.2d 829, 205 N.E.2d 866 (1965); In re Dow's Will, 32 Misc.
2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Surr. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 968, 162
N.Y.S.2d 196 (1957); In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Surf.
Ct. 1927).
26. 30 Misc. 2d 743, 219 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Surr. Ct. 1961), modified, 20
App. Div. 2d 808, 248 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1964), aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 829,
205 N.E.2d 866 (1965).
27. Accord, In re Evan's Estate, 212 Iowa 1, 232 N.W. 72 (1930)
(found good faith and declared that surcharge would be inequitable);
In re Koos' Estate, 269 Wis. 478, 69 N.W.2d 598 (1955) (found good faith
and that interests of corporation and trust were served); cf., In re
Halperin's Will, 201 Misc. 763, 106 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Surr. Ct. 1951) (direc-
tor and trustee separate offices though held by same individual).
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holder-the reasoning of the court that no conflict of interests
existed is questionable analysis for the planner to rely upon.
A second line of cases which refuses to apply the strict re-
quirement of undivided loyalty reasons that the testator created
the conflict and impliedly waived a rigid application of trust
rules.28 Further, these courts presume that by naming an in-
dividual as trustee, the testator manifested his faith in that in-
dividual's ability to act, notwithstanding any potential conflict
of interests. While this reasoning will yield results consistent
with the testator's intent, the approach is not entirely in har-
mony with prior trust law.29 Also, by focusing on the act of
naming an individual as trustee rather than on the nature of the
estate corporation, the problem is avoided but not solved. It
is submitted that the distinguishing factor between the estate
corporation and the simple trust should not be the act of select-
ing an individual as trustee, which is generic to the creation of
any trust,30 but rather the specific characteristics of the estate
corporation itself. However, from a planning standpoint, if the
courts will give effect to an implied intent it would seem advis-
able to manifest an express intent on as many problems as is
possible.
The strict application of the duty of loyalty to the estate
corporation raises several specific problems. It is particularly
troublesome with regard to the establishment of capital reserves
from the income of the corporation. 1 Unless otherwise speci-
28. The leading case is In re Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411
(1950): "[Wlhere the power, indeed duty, to engage in self-dealing is
necessarily implied in the terms of the testator's will the valid exercise
of that power will not be set aside by this court." Id. at 92, 73 A.2d at
416. Accord, Conant v. Lansden, 341 Ill. App. 488, 94 N.E.2d 594 (1950);
Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1952),
aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953); In re Balfe's Will, 245 App. Div. 22,
280 N.Y. Supp. 128 (1935); In re Steele's Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d
409 (1954); cf. In re Tuttle's Estate, 4 N.Y.2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 715 (1958).
29. Courts have been slow to create exceptions to trust law in
order to relieve a trustee from liability. This is illustrated by the tradi-
tionally narrow construction of exculpatory clauses. See note 64 infra
and accompanying text. It would seem that a principle as firmly en-
trenched as the duty of undivided loyalty should not be uprooted by
the patently ambiguous act of naming an individual trustee.
30. What if the individual named as trustee is unwilling or unable
to serve? Presumably, the result should not differ by virtue of the
named trustee's inability to serve.
31. See In re Warner's Trust, 263 Minn. 449, 117 N.W.2d 224 (1962);
Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold
on the Trustee-ContrQlled Business Enterprise, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 506,
816 (1962); Note, 60 HARv. L. Rav. 952 (1947); Note, 57 MxcH. L. Rav.
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fied, trust rules dictate that all current income produced by the
trust res be paid to the life beneficiary.82  The establishment of
a reserve fund from income not only withholds current income
but also tends to favor the remaindermen. However, reserves
for future expenses and depreciation are vital to the corporation
and its creditors.38 While the older cases indicated that a reten-
tion of income for future expenses would be a breach of trust,34
more recent cases seem to allow reserves to be established, at
least when they are reasonable,35 necessary, and authorized by
the testator.86
A further problem is the compensation of a trustee-direc-
tor.3 7 Trust rules limit a trustee's compensation, generally to a
small percentage of the value of the trust res.38 The older cases
limited a trustee-director to this "legal" compensation because of
his capacity as a trustee.39 However, the "legal" compensation
will generally be far below that normally paid to a director-
officer of a corporation. Recognizing this fact, some more recent
738, 744-54 (1959); Note, 46 AMUN. L. REv. 749 (1962); Note, 4 U. FLA.
L. REv. 41 (1951).
32. See RESTATEmET (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 235 (1959).
33. See Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A
Stranglehold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 506, 519 (1962).
34. See, e.g., Matter of McLaughlin's Estate, 164 lisc. 539, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In re Adler's Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
35. The issue of the reasonableness of a capital reserve involves the
courts in a review of the business judgment of the director. Such re-
view is basically a question of piercing -the corporate veil, see note 9
supra, since under corporate principles a director's business judgment
on the requirements and necessity for reserves will not normally be
questioned. See In re Evan's Estate, 212 Iowa 1, 232 N.W. 72 (1930);
In re Schnur's Estate, 39 Misc. 2d 880, 242 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Surr. Ct. 1963).
However, some courts have indicated that because the director is also
a trustee they will go behind his business judgment. See Rosencrans v.
Fry, 91 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1952) (dictum);
In re Horowitz's Will, 297 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E.2d 598 (1948).
36. See, e.g., Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162
(Super. Ct. Ch. 1952); cf. Cashman v. Petrie, 14 N.Y.2d 426, 201 N.E.2d
24 (1964).
37. See Annot., 99 A.L.R. 961 (1935).
38. See 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 242 (2d ed. 1956); cf. In re Tuttle's Es-
tate, 4 N.Y.2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 715 (1958); In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224
N.Y. Supp 466 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
39. See, e.g., Stone v. Baldwin, 348 Ill. App. 225, 109 N.E.2d 244
(1952); Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173 A.2d 191 (1934). See
generally In re Hirsch's Estate, 116 App. Div. 367, 101 N.Y. Supp. 893
(1908); In re Froelich's Estate, 122 App. Div. 440, 107 N.Y. Supp. 173
(1907), aff'd mem., 192 N.Y. 590, 85 N.E. 1110 (1908); In re Ferrante's
Estate, 190 Misc. 788, 74 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
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decisions have refused to limit a trustee-director's compensa-
tion,4o reasoning that without this liberalization, no individual
would assume the responsibilities of a director in return for the
compensation of a trustee.41 In addition, to the extent the cor-
poration would be required to pay management fees to someone,
and the trustee-director is the most qualified to manage, rigid
fee schedules could be relaxed.
Although the ideal solution would be for the courts to aban-
don the no further inquiry rule as applied to the estate corpora-
tion 42 and impose liability only on particular facts, 43 it is doubt-
40. See, e.g., Sueske v. Schofield, 376 Ill. 431, 34 N.E.2d 399 (1941);
Latorraca v. Latorraca, 132 N.J. Eq. 40, 26 A.2d 522 (Ch. 1942), af -'d
mem., 31 A.2d 819 (1943); In re Goldner's Will, 115 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107
(Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Block's Will, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr.
Ct. 1946); In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1927);
In re Peabody's Estate, 218 Wis. 569, 260 N.W. 444 (1935); In re Hartt's
Estate, 295 P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1956). But see In re Grace's Estate, 42 Misc.
2d 214, 247 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Surr. Ct. 1964).
41. The emerging standard appears to be whether the fees paid to
the trustee-director were reasonable. Relevant factors to determine
whether the salary received was reasonable include: (1) what similar
employees have been and are being paid; (2) whether the trustee
served the corporation before his appointment and at what salary;
(3) whether the position can be filled by another; (4) the time and
labor actually expended; (5) testator's intent; and (6) the risks and
responsibilities incurred by the trustee. See Stone v. Baldwin, 348 Ill.
App. 225, 109 N.E.2d 244 (1952); In re Block's Will, 186 Misc. 945, 60
N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Peabody's Estate, 218 Wis. 541, 260
N.W. 444 (1935).
42. The abolition of the no further inquiry rule has been urged in
other contexts. See Haggerty, Conflicting Interests of Estate Fiduciaries
in New York and the "No Further Inquiry" Rule, 18 FORDHAm L. REV. 1
(1949); Niles & Schwarz, Breach of Trust-Recent Developments, 20
N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 189-90 (1944). Within the context of the estate cor-
poration at least two courts. have intimated the abolition of the no fur-
ther inquiry rule. In Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162
(Super. Ct. Ch. 1952), it was said:
[The trustee] cannot be criticized upon the naked basis of
potentially conflicting interests, nor can the existence of that
potentiality per se constitute a culpable circumstance to be
charged against [the trustee] in determining whether he vio-
lated his duty as trustee..
Id',°at 298, 91 A.2d at 166. Dictum in In re Kellogg's Trust, 35 Misc. 2d
541, 546, 230 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1962), stated that a trustee should
not be-held liable "upon the basis of a conflict of interests so long as such
a conflict remained merely passive ......
43. A possible standard for judicial imposition of liability upon a
trustee-director of an estate corporation would include the following
factors: (1) Has the trustee-director acted in good faith? (2) Was
the action in question based on sound business judgment in light of the
circumstances at the time" the decision was made? (3) Was the loss
incurred of a permanent character or was it a temporary withholding
required by the- long term picture, such as the establishment of a
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ful they will do so. Since the -duty of undivided loyalty with no
further inquiry is too firmly entrenched to be easily uprooted,
an estate plan resting on the assumption that the courts will
alter their past decisions as a friendly gesture is precarious. It is
in this context that it becomes incumbent upon the planner to
either avoid the problem or draft an instrument within which
both the courts and the trustee-director can operate.
II. PLANNING
For purposes of the remaining discussion, the following hy-
pothetical facts will be assumed. The testator wishes to provide
for his wife after his death. His son is both capable of, and has
in fact participated in, the management of the close corporation,
which is the dominant asset of the estate and of value prin-
cipally as a going concern. The corporation has one class of
fully participating common stock. The testator holds sixty per-
cent of the stock; the remaining forty percent is split evenly be-
tween the testator's son and an unrelated third party. The third
party also has participated in the corporation's management.
Two caveats should be noted. First, any estate plan must be
tailored to the individual situation and desires of the particular
testator. The purpose of this Note is only to suggest some of the
possible solutions. Second, while tax factors may be significant
and should be considered, the following discussion is limited
solely to non-tax factors.
44
A. METHODS OF ELIMINATING TESTATOR'S CONTROLLING INTEREST
Should the testator fail to eliminate the close corporation
from his estate and the stock pass to a trust with the son as
trustee, the precarious position of the son, the trust, and the cor-
poration are apparent from the foregoing discussion. To avoid
these problems by eliminating the testator's controlling interest
in the corporation from his estate, a buy out or recapitalization
may be used.
While the testator is alive,45 the shareholders or the cor-
capital reserve for depreciation? (4) Is the gain received by a third
party detrimental and adverse to the trust beneficiary or is it merely
incidental and without prejudice to the beneficiary's rights? (5) Was
the relative harm incurred by the beneficiary greater or less than the
harm which would have befallen the corporation, its creditors, minor-
ity shareholders, and employees, had the action not been taken?
44. A discussion of the tax aspects of the proposed alternatives will
appear in a later issue of this Review.
45. While the decedent's interest may be sold after his death with-
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poration could execute an agreement to purchase his interest up-
on his death.46 The agreement could be funded by life insur-
ance, and the proceeds of such a sale placed in a trust to be
administered in the traditional manner. Through the use of the
buy out device, the close corporation would be continued without
danger of judicial interference, and the wife would be provided
with a steady, dependable means of support. However, to the
extent that the corporation has potential for rapid growth, and
the testator desires that his wife and other heirs participate in
this growth, a premature liquidation of his interest would be
undesirable.
An alternative means of removing the testator's voting con-
trol from his estate while retaining an equity interest in the
corporation for the beneficiary would be to recapitalize the cor-
poration and provide for additional classes of stock.47 The tes-
tator could convert a portion of his common stock into nonvoting
cumulative participating preferred, retaining the remainder of
the common and bequeathing it to the son outright. The par-
ticipating preferred would be given outright or in trust to the
wife by will naming a corporate trustee. Control would pass
smoothly to the son unburdened by trust; the wife would re-
ceive not only a relatively secure income producing source but
also, to the extent of her participation, an opporunity to share
in the potential growth of the company.
However, a recapitalization does create certain problems.
Such a plan would require the consent of the other sharehold-
ers48 since their interests would be affected. Further, any re-
capitalization should be effected during the testator's life since
his executor may have difficulties with the shareholders and
creditors in initiating such a plan.49 Moreover, although the
out the formalities of a buy out executed during his lifetime, such a
sale may be difficult. If either the corporation or the shareholders are
to purchase the testator's shares, not only the problem of share valua-
tion but also the possible need to fund such an agreement dictate care-
ful planning prior to death. See note 1 supra.
46. See generally Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Sub-
stantial Interest in a Closely Held Business, 46 IowA L. REv. 516, 518-71
(1961). A sample form for the buy out may be found in Steiner, The
Closely Held Corporation, 22 ALBANy L. REv. 102, 113-17 (1958).
47. See generally Wolfberg, Uses of Preferred Stock in Tax Plan-
ning for Closely Held Corporations, 44 TAxEs 52 (1966).
48. See, e.g., AMN. STAT. § 301.37 (1965), which states the required
vote to change the rights of various classes of stock. Generally, more
than a majority is required.
49. See In re Flagg's Estate, 865 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950) (action
to challenge trustee's plan of recapitalization). See generally Annot.,
93 A.L.R. 1520 (1934).
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preferred stock is participating, it may not reflect corporate
growth50 through an appreciation in dividends equivalent to that
received by common. On the other hand, should the corpora-
tion's earnings decrease, but remain large enough to pay some
dividends, the cumulative rights given to the wife might en-
courage her son as director to declare dividends, thereby de-
creasing the working capital at a time when it is most needed.
The elimination of the testator's controlling interest in the
corporation from his estate would benefit the son by allowing
him greater freedom in the corporation's management. Further,
by eliminating this restraint upon management the corporation
itself would have a greater chance for prosperity. Yet to the
extent that the testator desires his heirs to participate in the
future growth and prosperity of the corporation, he most likely
will desire that the controlling interest remain an asset of his
estate.
B. RETENTION OF THE CONTROLLING ASSET WITHIN THE ESTATE
If the testator rejects both the buy out and recapitalization
in favor of retaining the controlling interest in his estate,51 care-
ful planning must be done to mitigate the problems inherent in
the application of the duty of undivided loyalty. If retained as
an asset of the estate, presumably the controlling interest will
be held in trust. Even if a trust is not created, the executor's
powers to run the business should be expressed in the will
since the period of probate may be lengthy.
1. The Role of the Corporate Fiduciary
An estate planner must advise his client as to who should
be the trustee or executor. A corporate fiduciary would provide
50. A rapid increase in profits might normally'lead to stock splits
and first options on later issues. One advantage of a recapitalization
or buy out is the elimination of the trustee-director's difficult position
with respect to the duty of undivided loyalty. It has been suggested
that to the extent that the trustee-director exercises such rights he is
affirming and consolidating the conflicting interests. See Pierson, Stock
of a Closely Held Corporation as an Origina. Trust Res or a Subsequent
Investment, 11 OKLA. L. REv. 38, 51-52 (1958); cf. In re Grace's Estate,
42 Misc. 2d 214, 247 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Surr. Ct. 1964). Yet a refusal to
exercise such an option may also be a breach of trust since the trust
may lose its controlling interest in the corporation.
51. For reasons why a testator may not desire his interest to be
liquidated upon his death, see Adelman, The Power to Carry on the
Business of a Decedent, 36 McH. L. REv. 185-86 (1937); Polasky, Plan-
ning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest in a Closely Held Busi-
ness, 44 IowA L. Ruv. 83, 106-37 (1958).
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experience and expertise in the tax and management problems
of estates. Assuming it would accept the trust,5 2 the corporate
trustee may choose to play either an active or passive role in
the management of the corporation. 3 To the extent that the
corporate fiduciary plays an active role in the business, its man-
agement policy may differ from that of the incumbent manager.
In addition, because of the corporate fiduciary's traditional com-
mittee approach to the solution of management problems, it may
tend toward conservatism and stifle the growth prospects of the
corporation.54
The testator may appoint the corporate fiduciary as either
co-trustee with his son or as sole trustee. If the corporate
fiduciary becomes co-trustee it may be more likely to play a pas-
sive role in the management of the corporation.55 Also, at least
one court has indicated that the consent of the corporate fidu-
ciary co-trustee will protect the individual trustee from liability
based on divided loyalty.50
The availability of a corporate fiduciary may encourage the
use of a "directory trust."57 With a directory trust the testator
would appoint the corporate fiduciary merely to hold the stock
as if it were a normal trust asset. The will would provide for
the election of the son as a director of the corporation 8 or as
52. Although the attitude may be changing, there is some indica-
tion that corporate fiduciaries will not accept trusts containing busi-
nesses. See Cowdery, To Handle or Not to Handle, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES
485 (1955); Smith, How to Operate a Business, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1141
(1959); Symposium, Handling Businesses in Trust, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES
105 (1954). At least one corporate fiduciary has stated that it accepts
trusts containing business interests only with a view toward liquidation
of those interests and reinvestment of the proceeds in more traditional
trust holdings. Pfleiderer, When the Fiduciary Takes Over, 93 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 107 (1954).
53. The corporate fiduciary may have a duty to play an active
role. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Foulke, The Family Business, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 606
(1961).
55. If the son acts as co-trustee, the corporate fiduciary may rely
on his mother's reluctance to sue. If a suit is nevertheless brought, the
corporate fiduciary would probably be entitled to contribution from the
son. See BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 584-91 (2d ed. 1960).
56. In re Steele's Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954).
57. See Cronin, Effectiveness of Exculpatory Clauses in Directory
Trusts, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1147 (1959); Knecht, Trust Adviser: Boon
or Booby Trap? 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 815 (1955); Note, Directory Trusts
and the Exculpatory Clause, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 138 (1965); Note, Trust
Advisers, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
58. If the will required the shares to be voted in a particular man-
ner it might be construed as a voting trust and be subject to attack for
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trust adviser.59 The corporate fiduciary then would be excul-
pated from liability for business activities, 0 and the son's judg-
ment in the management of the business would be judged by
corporate principles.""
2. Drafting for the Retention
In general
In drafting the administrative provisions, special care should
be taken to state the duties and liabilities of the trustee. Be-
cause the administrative provisions will be in derogation of the
common law duty of loyalty with no further inquiry, the tes-
tator's awareness of the problem and his solution to it must be
expressed. From the drafting viewpoint, there are three pos-
sible attitudes: imposition of mandatory duties, exculpation from
traditional liability, or grant of discretionary powers.
Imposition of mandatory duties (for example, requiring the
trustee to accept and manage the corporation) may be the safest
technique to facilitate the adaptation of trust principles to the
estate corporation. When the instrument imposes duties upon
the trustee, he can then argue that unless he acts in accordance
with these prescribed duties he will be in breach of trust.62 In
addition, insofar as a court desires to give effect to the testator's
intent, a trustee would be relatively safe in following the testa-
tor's orders. Yet the needs of the estate corporation may change
enough to make the duties imposed inappropriate. Corporate
fiduciaries have stated that they will not accept a trust expressly
requiring the trustee to perform given acts with respect to the
corporation, preferring one empowering them to act in manners
which they deem proper.6 3
failing to meet the statutory requirements. Cf. Abercrombie v. Davies,
123 A.2d 893 (Del. 1956).
59. See Note, Trust Advisers, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
60. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
61. However, because the son no longer stands in the fiduciary
position of trustee for his mother, her interests may not be as well
protected.
62. See Conant v. Lansden, 341 Ill. App. 488, 94 N.E.2d 594 (1950);
In re Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950).
63. See Foulke, The Family Business, 100 TRUSTS & EsTATEs 606
(1961); Trachtman, Closely Held Businesses, 90 TausTs & ESTATES 668
(1951). But see Adelman, The Power to Carry on the Business of a
Decedent, 36 licH. L. REV. 185, 187 (1937), which seems to suggest that
without a requirement in the will that the executor must carry on the
business, he would be acting without authority should he assume control.
The imposition of a duty to run the business may be disadvanta-
geous with regard to the trustee's right to a salary as a corporate officer.
In In re Froelich's Estate, 122 App. Div. 440, 107 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1907),
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Although a broad exculpatory provision will be narrowly
construed6 4 and thus be ineffective, a properly drafted clause
will probably restrict liability 5 if a standard is included by
which the trustee's conduct can be judged.6 6 However, such a
clause must state with particularity each act for which immunity
is desired. 7 Thus the inability to foresee all sources of liability
prevents complete protection.
The affirmative grant of discretionary powers may be the
best approach. Whether the grant of powers approach will be
successful depends solely upon a court's willingness to effectuate
the testator's intent, and thus the latter will not be as reliable as
the imposition of duties.68 Still a grant of powers will allow the
trustee greater freedom to both accept and work within the
trust.
The charter and bylaws of the corporation should be con-
sidered when planning for an estate corporation. At a minimum
these documents should be consistent with those of the trust
lest the trustee be forced to choose between them. The bylaws
could also set out the powers and duties with respect to such
matters as salary and details of dividend distribution; the will
aff'd meri., 192 N.Y. 590, 85 N.E. 1110 (1908), the trustee-director of an
estate corporation was surcharged for his salary even though the will
apparently authorized its payment. The appellate division reasoned
that since the will required the trustee to run the business, his manage-
ment activities were transformed into trust duties, making him liable
for any compensation received in excess of his statutory fee.
64. See In re Anneke's Trust, 229 MAnn. 60, 72, 38 N.W.2d 177, 183
(1949); 2 ScoTT, TRusTs § 222.2 (2d ed. 1956); Fletcher, Divided Loyalty
and Self-Dealing, 94 TRUSTS & EsTATEs 234 (1955); Note, 20 MN. L.
REV. 210 (1935).
65. See In re Dow's Will, 32 Misc. 2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Surr.
Ct. 1955), af'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 968, 162 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1957); Annot., 158
A.L.R. 276 (1945); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 616 (1933). The most common use
of exculpatory clauses-limiting liability for negligence or inadvert-
ence-may present analytical difficulty when utilized in an instrument
creating an estate corporation. The trustee-director of an estate cor-
poration presumably has been selected for his unique skill and experi-
ence with the corporation, and to exculpate him from negligence or
inadvertence while simultaneously affirming his competence would
seem to be inconsistent. Appropriate precatory statements should be
included to explain this anomaly.
66. For a possible alternative standard in the case of an estate cor-
poration, see note 43 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
68. The grant of powers would be in the nature of precatory words.
Courts have generally stated that precatory words will not be given
binding effect. See, e.g., Barrenscheen v. Grosch, 306 Ill. App. 200, 28
N.E.2d 181 (1940); In re Oliver's Will, 42 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
Compare note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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should incorporate the bylaws by reference. An advantage of
using the corporate documents would be to encourage the appli-
cation of corporate principles to a trustee-director's acts. More-
over, to the extent that the charter and bylaws are considered
a contract among the shareholders, the shareholders will be
bound by their provisions. However, the probate court may dis-
regard the bylaws in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
trust. 9
A sample clause
For many years I have been engaged in the manu-
facturing business owned and operated by XYZ Inc., a
domestic corporation of state A. Since I am the principal
and majority stockholder, and since in all probability the
chief asset of my estate will consist of shares of stock of
said corporation, it is my wish and desire and I do hereby
authorize (but do not require) my executors and trus-
tees,70 if my estate does in fact own a stock interest and
so long as it does, to assume control and continue opera-
tion of the business71 of said corporation for such period
as they deem advisable and as is authorized under the
terms of this will. It is my belief that through the con-
tinued operation of XYZ Inc., or its successor corporation,
as a going business the interests of both my wife Jane and
my son John will be best served. In the event that the
corporation does not continue to serve either of these in-
terests, my executors and trustees are authorized to sell
or retain the business as they deem advisable.
This trust is created to provide for my beloved wife,
Jane, during her life should she survive me. Although it
is my intention that the executors and trustees under
this instrument should protect and represent my wife
Jane's interest, I do desire, and hereby express my inten-
tion that, insofar as possible, my executors and trustees
shall manage this trust and the corporation contained
therein so as to maximize the interests of not only my wife
but also the corporation. (For purposes of determining
the interests of the corporation, the needs of the corpora-
tion in order to continue in the industry as a growing and
prosperous business, and the responsibilities of the cor-
poration to its shareholders and creditors shall be con-
sidered). It is my intention, and I do believe, that through
69. See note 9 supra.
70. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
71. Absent express authority in the will to carry on the business
an executor would be subject to liability should he do so. An executor
is under a duty to liquidate the assets of an estate, and a trustee must
invest the proceeds in "legal" assets. A close corporation is not a legal
asset. See Adelman, The Power to Carry on the Business of a Decedent,
36 MifcH. L. REv. 185 (1958).
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careful management the interests of my wife and the cor-
poration can be simultaneously served. If and only if it
should appear that this end can not be achieved and that
the interests of my wife and the corporation should be-
come incompatible, it is my intention that my executors
and trustees should act in the interest of my wife.7 2
Throughout the existence of the corporation my son,
John Doe, has played an important and integral part in its
growth and success. I am fully aware that my son John
is a director and officer of XYZ Corporation. It is my be-
lief, and I do affirm, that because of my son John's ex-
perience and expertise, he is the person best qualified to
manage and control the corporation; I desire that he be
allowed to continue in this position.
Because of my trust and belief in my son John's in-
tegrity and skill in management of the assets of my estate
and the trust created of it, r appoint him co-executor and
co-trustee.73 I am fully aware that my son John holds,
individually and free of trust, capital stock in XYZ Inc.,
but I do not desire, nor do I make it a condition of his
appointment as co-executor or co-trustee that he divest
himself of such stock. I am aware that if my son retains
his position as director and assumes the positions of co-
executor and co-trustee, I have placed him in a position in
which a court may find him to be acting with conflicting
interests and that as a result he may be held liable with-
out further inquiry for acting in such a situation regard-
less of any fault or wrongful conduct on his part. I do
hereby express my intent that such principles of law as
would impose strict liability upon my son John as trustee
solely on the basis of such potentially conflicting interests
should not be applied and that my executors and trustees
should be exculpated from any and all strict liability as a
result thereof.
I direct and it is my intention that my executors and
trustees be held to the following standard with respect to
their activities in management of the corporation. 74 My
executors and trustees shall at all times act with and be
held to a standard of good faith reasonable business judg-
ment 75 considering the interests of my wife and the cor-
poration. For purposes of determining their good faith and
reasonable business judgment, my executors and trustees
72. Unfortunately, at some point the testator must decide whether
the wife or corporation should be preferred in the event of irreconcil-
able conflict.
73. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of judicial treatment of the application of the
business judgment rule to the issue of establishment of capital reserves,
see note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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shall have the burden to prove good faith.7 6 The rights
and interests of both the trust and the corporation shall at
all times be considered. 77 My executors and trustees shall
not be liable for gains to the corporation which do not
accrue to the beneficiary.7 8
If my son John as executor and/or trustee participates
actively in the management of XYZ Inc., whether directly
as an officer of the corporatior or otherwise, he shall be
entitled, and shall agree by accepting the position, to re-
ceive reasonable compensation 79 which the corporation
would be required to pay to any individual in order to
secure equivalent management functions. Such compen-
sation shall be paid solely by the corporation. For pur-
poses of determining what is reasonable compensation, the
following factors shall be relevant but not determinative:
(1) the fair market value of his services as determined by
compensations paid to individuals in similar positions in
similar firms; (2) the compensation paid to that individual
who holds the same position at the time of my death as
my son shall hold as director,"c increased or decreased in
relation to the change in net income of the corporation.
In any event such compensation shall be not less than one
percent nor more than fifteen percent of the annual gross
income of the corporation.81
In the event that such compensation in the nature of a
76. One policy underlying the duty of undivided loyalty is that
because the beneficiary would neither have access to nor an understand-
ing of trust transactions, the trustee should be absolutely liable in a
situation where he may not act in the interest of the beneficiary. See
Hoover, Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty, 5 CLEV.-MAR. L.
Rsv. 7, 11 (1956). It would seem that the proper way to effectuate such
policies would be to require the trustee to establish his good faith rather
than to refuse to inquire into it. See Haggerty, Conflicting Interests of
Estate Fiduciaries in New York and the "No Further Inquiry" Rule, 18
FoRDiAM L. REv. 1 (1949); Niles & Schwartz, Breach of Trust-Recent
Developments, 20 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1944).
77. Trust law states that the sole relevant consideration for a trus-
tee shall be the interest of the beneficiary. See note 6 supra and accom-
panying text.
78. Trust law holds that a trustee acting with conflicting interests
may be accountable for all gains to parties other than the beneficiary.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
80. See In re Hartt's Estate, 295 P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1956), where the
court approved a trustee-director's salary equal to that received by the
testator during his life.
81. Cf. In re Froelich's Estate, 122 App. Div. 440, 107 N.Y. Supp. 175
(1907), aff'd mem., 192 N.Y. 590, 85 N.E. 1110 (1908), where a percent-
age format was apparently approved although the trustee was denied
compensation on other grounds. If a percentage clause is used, the
range should be broad enough to accommodate any possible change in
the corporation's earnings. The percentage should be of the corpora-
tion's gross income to insure a corporation deduction for the salary.
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management fee shall be paid to my son John, and so long
as it is, it shall be his sole compensation for management of
the trust created under this will and he shall not receive
additional trustee's fees. 2
If my son John shall cease, or be required to cease, ac-
tive participation in the management of the corporation,
or if the corporation ceases to be an asset of my estate or
the trust herein created, and my son John continues to
serve as co-executor or co-trustee, he shall be entitled to
trustee fees as required by law.
The foregoing is illustrative of the type of language which
should be included in any instrument creating an estate cor-
poration in order to ameliorate the application of the duty of
undivided loyalty. It is believed that the opening precatory par-
agraphs are both helpful and necessary in interpreting the tes-
tator's intent as to the duties and liabilities of the trustee-
director. The compensation provision is specifically included
because of the substantial litigation on the question.8 3 Similarly,
an equally explicit clause as to the duties and liabilities con-
cerning the declaration of dividends should be included. 4 An
illustrative clause on dividend declaration has not been included
because it is thought that this question is so intimately connected
with the needs of each individual corporation and its likelihood
for future earnings that such a clause must be specifically tail-
ored to meet the needs of the corporation in question. The
corporation's bylaws should be amended specifically to include
the substance, if not the actual language of the compensation
and dividend clauses in order to eliminate any conflict.
The draftsman should also include provisions addressed to
problems which may arise in the course of running the business.
Since such provisions would be in the nature of boiler plate and
are beyond the scope of this Note, sample provisions have not
82. To the extent that a court may be influenced by statutory trus-
tees' fees, see note 38 supra and accompanying text. The specific nega-
tion of those standards may authorize the receipt of a more reasonable
sum.
83. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
84. Apportioning income between dividends and reserves may be
the most difficult problem faced by the trustee-director. Cf. Krasno-
wiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the
Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, 110 U. PA. L. RLv. 506, 816
(1962). See also note 35 supra and accompanying text.
To the extent that the testator does not indicate his desires, a court
may rely on the past history of dividend payment when called upon to
evaluate a trustee-director's acts. See Rosencrans v. Fry, 21 N. J. Super.
289, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1952), affd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905
(1953).
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been provided. 8 At a minimum such provisions should include
discretion to carry on the corporation,8" to alter or expand the
business nature of the corporation should it be necessary, 7 and
to establish capital reserves.88
3. Discouraging a Challenge of the Fiduciary's Conduct
Although careful drafting to protect the trustee-director,
corporation, and estate beneficiary is essential, it may not be
effective. To further protect the trustee-director, devices such as
consent provisions, insurance plans, indemnity provisions, and
recovery clauses should be considered.
If the beneficiaries are sui generis, they may consent to the
unusual form of administration required by the estate corpora-
tion, and such consent will probably be given effect to bar a
subsequent challenge.8 9 In addition, the trustee-director may
seek court approval which, if given, will insulate him from sub-
sequent liability.90 The trustee-director may take out insurance
to indemnify himself from liability resulting from acting with
conflicting interests. If the will or trust permits, the premiums
on such policies probably can be paid by the corporation. 1
Similarly, the will can state that the trust or corporation
should indemnify the trustee out of income for liability, incurred
solely because of his dual position as trustee-director.92 Should
such a provision be given effect, the life beneficiary would be
discouraged from suit because there would be no net benefit.
Of course such a provision would not discourage suit by the
remainderman since his recovery would be at the expense of the
85. Sample boiler plate clauses may be found in FINGAR & BOOK-
STAVER, NEW YORK WILLS §§ 125, 167 (1949); STEPHENSON, DRAFTING
WILLs AND TRUST AGREEMENTS 129-56 (1955). P-H WILLS-TRuSTS-
ESTATE PLANNING FoRmVrs, 63,001-02, 62,300-08.
86. See note 71 supra.
87. Absent such authority the trustee-director may not be able to
change the nature of the business. See In re Doelger's Estate, 254 App.
Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1938).
88. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
89. See BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 941 (2d ed. 1962).
90. See In re Tuttle's Estate, 4 N.Y.2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 715 (1958)
(dictum); In re Tannenbaum's Estate, 30 Misc. 2d 743, 219 N.Y.S.2d 149
(Surr. Ct. 1961) (dictum), modified, 20 App. Div. 2d 808, 248 N.Y.S.2d
749 (1964), affd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 829, 205 N.E.2d 866 (1965). In addi-
tion, by obtaining court approval prior to the act, the danger of judicial
second-guessing is lessened.
91. See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS '§ 264, at p. 1488 (1st ed. 1939).
92. Cf. S=EPHENSON, op. cit. supra note 85, at § 13.20.
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life beneficiary.93 Finally, the will can provide that any damages
recovered because of the trustee-director's position of divided
loyalty would accrue to the corporation rather than to the trust.9 4
Because the life beneficiary could not directly recover, he would
lack a motive for suit in a case where no actual harm was done.
CONCLUSION
The application of traditional trust principles to the estate
corporation has hindered the emergence of this device as a truly
effective estate planning tool. Although some courts have recog-
nazed the inherent differences between the investment trust and
the estate corporation, there is little hope of an immediate and
widespread modification of the duty of undivided loyalty with
no further inquiry. In this context it is incumbent upon the
estate planner to recognize the problems involved, to avoid them,
or to alter their application.
93. The provision could be modified to state that the trustee shall
be indemnified out of corpus should the remainderman sue. The value
of such a provision is questionable, however, since -if the trust is indem-
nifier, this would entail a sale of the stock which would risk a loss of
control, or if the corporation is the indemnifier, a sale of assets which
could be harmful to the corporation.
94. See The Fiduczary Aspects ot Estate. Corporations, 57 MIcH. L.
Rsv. 738, 742 (1959).
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